When the Backup App Is the Breach: Lessons from the ConnectWise Cloud Backup Incident
Attackers didn't phish anyone. They signed in to Microsoft 365 as a backup app, using permissions customers had already granted. Here is what happened and what to check.
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This is a developing story. Details below are from public reports as of 18 October 2026 and may change.
What happened
ConnectWise has shut down customer access to its Cloud Backup service (formerly SkyKick Cloud Backup) after attackers got into the service's application identities and used them to reach Microsoft 365 tenants (BleepingComputer).
Reports of unauthorized access began on Friday 16 October. Huntress said it had identified at least 162 compromised tenants in its own environment. The Hacker News puts the figure at 173 tenants. The counts differ by source, and the total is still unclear.
Microsoft says it saw unauthorized authentication attempts from one IP address on 15 October and calls this an active supply-chain attack. Huntress links scripted sign-in attempts from the same address to 13 and 14 October.
ConnectWise says it has disabled seven application identities (The Hacker News). It says it has no indication that stored backup archives were compromised. How the attacker obtained the vendor credential has not been disclosed.
Why this one is different
Nobody's password was stolen, and nobody was tricked into approving a prompt.
When a customer installs a backup tool for Microsoft 365, Entra ID creates a service principal. That is the app's own identity inside the tenant. It holds whatever permissions the admin granted, often very broad ones, and it signs in with a secret rather than a person's login.
According to Todyl, as reported by BleepingComputer, the attacker authenticated directly as the backup application using its secret. The sign-ins came from a script and involved no user login, so MFA never came into play. The app already held broad permissions in each tenant, which would have allowed reading and writing mail, OneDrive and SharePoint files, and Teams chats.
Microsoft assessed that the attacker likely abused existing permissions such as Directory.ReadWrite.All.
What attackers did once in
Findings differ by vendor, which is normal early in an incident:
- Todyl analyzed nine tenants and saw only sign-in activity. It found no evidence of new accounts, added permissions, password changes or persistence.
- Huntress saw service principals for ConnectWise's Cloud Management apps assign themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator, in nearly 50 monitored tenants. In one tenant, an app granted itself Global Administrator and added credentials, and the whole sequence took about five minutes.
- Microsoft observed persistence via a backdoor after successful sign-in, followed by Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add more credentials.
Why the shutdown doesn't finish the job
This is the part I'd stress to anyone running Microsoft 365.
- Disabling the vendor's apps stops new tokens from being issued. Tokens already issued can stay valid until they expire.
- Revoking user sessions does not end application access.
- Any credentials the attacker added inside a tenant stay there. Huntress advises reviewing secrets and certificates on all applications for additions since 13 October.
What to check this week
If you manage Microsoft 365 tenants, or your MSP does, work through this list:
- Find the apps. Look in Entra ID enterprise applications for ConnectWise Cloud Backup and the ConnectWise Cloud Management apps. Older tenants may list them as "SkyKick Cloud Manager". Huntress published the full list of application IDs.
- Check service principal sign-ins. Filter by the Cloud Backup application ID and look for unexpected source addresses. Reported indicators include IP
144.172.64[.]128and the user agentscurl/7.88.1,python-urllib/3.12andpython-requests. - Look for role changes. Check whether any of these apps assigned themselves Exchange Administrator or Global Administrator.
- Audit credentials. Review secrets and certificates added to any application since 13 October, and remove anything you can't explain.
- Review OAuth grants and Graph activity. This is what Microsoft recommends.
- Don't assume an unused app is harmless. One administrator reported an alert about a SkyKick service principal assigning itself a role, even though they hadn't used the app in years.
For the primary guidance, see Huntress and ConnectWise's advisory page.
Lessons
- Third-party apps are identities too. Treat them like privileged accounts: least privilege, an owner, and regular review.
- MFA protects people, not secrets. A leaked app secret bypasses it completely. Monitor service principal sign-ins as closely as user sign-ins.
- Old integrations are live risk. An app you stopped using years ago can still hold permissions in your tenant.
- Vendor remediation is only half of it. The vendor can rotate its own credentials, but changes made inside your tenant are yours to find.
- Backups are a high-value target. A tool that can read everything in order to restore it can also be used to steal everything.
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